TL 2451

Why should we devote attention to East Timor, a small and remote place that most Americans have never even heard of?

Noam Chomsky

.....There are two reasons, each more than sufficient. The first is that East Timor has been, and still is, the scene of enormous massacres and suffering. Many of the terrible things that happen in the world are out of our control. We may deplore them, but we cannot do very much about them. This case is quite different, hence far more important. What has happened and what lies ahead are very much under our control, so directly that the blood is on our hands. The second reason is that by considering what has happened in East Timor since 1975, we can learn some important things about ourselves, about our society and our institutions. If we do not like what we find when we look at the facts—and few will fail to be appalled if they take an honest look—we can work to bring about changes in the practices and structure of institutions that cause terrible suffering and slaughter. To the extent that we see ourselves as citizens in a democratic community, we have a responsibility to devote our energies to these ends. The recent history of Timor provides a revealing insight into the policies of the U.S. government, the factors that enter into determining them, and the ways in which our ideological system functions.



The bare facts are as follows. East Timor was a Portuguese colony. The Western half of the island of Timor, a Dutch colony, became part of Indonesia when Indonesia gained its own independence.After the Portuguese revolution of 1974, several political parties emerged in East Timor, of which two, UDT and Fretilin, had significant popular support. In August 1975, an attempted coup by UDT, backed and perhaps inspired by Indonesia, led to a brief civil war in which 2-3000 people were killed. By early September, Fretilin had emerged victorious. The country was open to foreign observers including representatives of the International Red Cross and Australian aid organizations, journalists, and others. Their reactions were quite positive. They were impressed by the level of popular support and the sensible measures of agricultural reform, literacy programs, and so on, that were being undertaken. The outstanding Australian specialist on East Timor, James Dunn, describes Fretilin at the time as "populist Catholic."

The territory was then at peace, apart from Indonesian military attacks at the border and naval bombardment. Indonesian military harassment began immediately after the Fretilin victory in September, including a commando attack that killed five Australian journalists, a clear and well-understood warning to foreigners that the Indonesian military wanted no one to observe what it was contemplating. Fretilin requested that Portugal take responsibility for the process of decolonization and called on other countries to send observers, but there was no response. Recognizing that international support would not be forthcoming, Fretilin declared independence on November 28,1975. On December 7, Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion, capturing the capital city of Dili. The attack took place a few hours after the departure of President Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger from Jakarta. There is no serious doubt that the U.S. knew of the impending invasion and specifically authorized it. Ford has conceded as much in an interview with Jack Anderson, 9 November 1979 while claiming ignorance of the exact circumstances *(Washington Post)*.

The invading Indonesian army was 90%-supplied with U.S. arms. In Congressional Hearings, government representatives testified that the U.S. had imposed a 6-month arms ban in response to the invasion, but this was so secret that Indonesia knew nothing about it. Arms continued to flow, and in fact new offers of arms were made, including counterinsurgency equipment, during the period of the "arms ban," as was conceded by administration spokesmen when the facts were exposed by Cornell University Indonesian specialist Ben Anderson. The invasion was bloody and brutal. Subsequently Indonesia extended its aggression to other parts of the territory, and by 1977-8 was engaged in a program of wholesale destruction including massive bombardment, forced-population removal, destruction of villages and crops, and all the familiar techniques used by modern armies to subjugate a resisting population. The precise scale of the atrocities is difficult to assess, in part because Indonesia refused to admit outside observers, for reasons that are readily understood. Even the International Red Cross was excluded. But there has been ample evidence from refugees, letters smuggled out, Church sources, the occasional journalist granted a brief guided tour, and the Indonesian authorities themselves. If the facts were not known in the West, it was the result of the decision not to let them be known. It appears that of the pre-war population of about 700,000, perhaps one quarter have succumbed to outright slaughter or starvation caused by the Indonesian attack, and that the remaining population, much of which is herded into military-run concentration camps, may suffer a similar fate unless properly supervised international assistance is forthcoming on a substantial scale. Relief officials who were finally

Timor, an island in the East Indies some 350 miles northwest of Australia, was colonized by Portugal in the sixteenth century. As Dutch control of the East Indies grew, Portuguese influence was reduced to the eastern half of Timor and three small territories around the island. When the Netherlands East Indies declared its independence in 1945 as the Republic of Indonesia, West Timor became part of this new state. East Timor remained in the hands of the Portuguese, however, until August 1975. At that time, Lisbon's colonial authorities abandoned the territory when armed conflict broke out between rival East Timorese groups.



permited limited access to the territory after almost four years describe the prevailing situation as comparable to Cambodia in 1979. The world reaction has been somewhat different in the two cases.

The U.S. government continued throughout to provide the military and diplomatic support that was required for the slaughter to continue. By late 1977, Indonesian supplies had been depleted. The Human Rights Administration dramatically increased the flow of military equipment, enabling Indonesia to undertake the fierce offensives that reduced East Timor to the level of Cambodia. U.S. allies have also joined in providing the needed military and diplomatic support. The United Nations has repeatedly condemned the Indonesian aggression and called for the exercise of the right of self-determination in East Timor, as have the non-aligned nations. But the West has succeeded in blocking any significant measures. The UN General Assembly met immediately after the invasion, but was unable to react in a meaningful way. The reasons are explained by UN Ambassador Daniel P.Moynihan in his memoirs: "...the United States wished things to turn out as they did,and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success."

Ambassador Moynihan was presumably aware of the nature of his success. He cites a February 1976 estimate by the deputy chairman of the provisional government installed by Indonesian force "that some sixty thousand persons had been killed since the outbreak of civil war" — recall that 2-3000 had been killed during the civil war itself — "10 percent of the population, almost the proportion of casualties experienced by the Soviet Union during the Second World War." Thus in effect he is claiming credit for "success" in helping to cause a massacre that he compares to the consequences of Nazi aggression, not to speak of the growing number of victims in the subsequent period. Moynihan was much admired for the great courage that he displayed in the United Nations in confronting the mighty Third World enemies of the U.S. Somehow, his self-congratulation in this case escaped notice.

Ambassador Moynihan commented further that the Indonesian invasion must have been sucessful by March 1976, since "the subject disappeared from the press and from the United Nations after that time." It did virtually disappear from the press, though not from the United Nations, which has regularly condemned Indonesian aggression (most recently in December 1979).The curtain of silence drawn by the press in the United States and much of the West for four years hardly demonstrates the sucess of Indonesian arms, though it does stand as a remarkable testimonial to the effectiveness of Western propaganda systems.

Throughout, the U.S.government has pretended that it knew very little about events in East Timor, an obvious fabrication. Or else government representatives claimed at each stage that though there might have been some atrocities at the outset, the situation is now calm and the sensible course is to recognize Indonesian control. This was, for example, the stance taken by the government in 1977 Congressional Hearings, at exactly the time when Indonesia was preparing the murderous offensives of 1977-8 and when the Human Rights Administration was accelerating the flow of arms for use in these military operations. The "Human Rights" reports of the State Department not only fail to consider the ample evidence of massive atrocities, but go so far as to pretend that the issue does not arise. A November 1979 report for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research Service is typical of government pronouncements (*Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance,* p.144). The report discusses the alleged improvement in Indonesia's human rights record-students of Orwell may be intrigued by the fact that in government "Human Rights" reports dealing with "friendly states, the record is always one of "improvement," whatever may have happened in the past. The November 1979 report informs us that

> Indonesia's takeover of East Timor, formerly Portuguese Timor, in December 1975 may have been an exception to his trend of improvement, but the conflicting claims and lack of access into Timor by non-Indonesians make it difficult if not impossible to ascertain the loss of life in the heavy fighting of December 1975-March 1976. Recently, reports from Timor indicate a partial return

> to normalcy there although genuine self-determination for the Timorese is a dim prospect.

The latter conclusion is certainly correct, as long as the U.S. government persists in its policy of supporting Indonesian terror while denying its existence, and as long as the media loyally refrain from exposing the facts. This report is typical not only in its claim that "now" things are finally improving (the constant plea throughout) but also in its failure to concede that questions even arise about the period after March 1976.

The picture is a bit different when we turn to Timorese witnesses. One of the most impressive of these is Father Leoneto Vierira do Rego, a 63-year-old Portuguese priest who spent 3 years in the mountains with Fretilin before surrendering to Indonesian forces in January 1979, suffering from malaria and starvation. After imprisonment and interrogation, he was permitted to return to Portugal in June. His accounts of what he had observed were then widely reported in the world press, outside of the United States. Shortly after the appearance of the government report cited above, Father Leoneto was interviewed by the *New York Times* (14 Dec. 1979). The transcript of the interview was leaked to the *Boston Globe* (20 Jan. 1980). Father Leoneto said that during 1976, things were normal in the mountains where he was living, and where most of the population was, including those who had fled from Dili:

> Apart from the main towns, people in the interior weren't aware of the war. People had food commodities aplenty. It was a normal life under not-normal circumstances. Problems started in early 1977. A full-scale bombardment of the whole island began. From that point there emerged death, illness, despair. The second phase of the bombing was late 1977 to early 1979, with modern aircraft. This was the firebombing phase of the bombing. Even up to this time, people could still live. The genocide and starvation was the result of the full-scale incendiary bombing...We saw the end coming. People could not plant. I personally witnessed — while running to protected areas, going from tribe to tribe — the great massacre from bombardment and people dying from starvation. In 1979 people began surrendering because there was no other option. When people began dying, then others began to give up.

Father Leoneto estimated that 200,000 people had died during the four years of war. Of all of this, what survived in the *Times* account was the following sentence:

> He said that bombardment and systematic destruction of croplands in 1978 were intended to starve the islanders into submission.

Recall that the offensives of 1977-79 reported by Father Leoneto, as by many others during this period and since, coincided with the sharp increase in arms supplies from the Human Rights Administration.

Refugees continue to report large-scale atrocities. By 1979, some foreign aid was reaching the territory, but distribution is largely under Indonesian military control. A report in the *London Observer* (20 January, 1980) notes that "All relief work in the former Portuguese colony is being supervised by only four foreign field workers." The report continues:

> 'We appeal to anyone left in the world with a minimum sense of human rights to ensure that relief goes directly to our people,' said a refugee who preferred to remain anonymous as his family is still in East Timor and that, contrary to other reports, fighting between the Indonesians and the Timorese Liberation Movement was continuing in the mountains to the east of the island. They claimed Indonesian troops were terrorising the local population with arrests, tortures, and summary executions. They described the methods by which the authorities manipulated tours by visiting journalists. The Timorese claim that troops and war material are removed to give impression of calm. One woman said that she had seen crosses taken from the local military cemetery. The authorities kept a tight control, informing their 'representatives' in relief camps and placing armed plain-clothed military officers among the crowds. The growing evidence of the corruption and violation of human rights in East Timor has begun to filter out and is threatening to put the issue at the center of a diplomatic offensive. Portugal and the US are particularly involved.

Though, it must be added, they are involved in quite different ways. Portugal, particularly the new conservative government, is seeking to gain international support to save the Timorese from final destruction and to compel Indonesia to withdraw. The U.S. government is trying to stem the increasing flow of exposures and to guarantee Indonesian control over the miserable remnants of the U.S.-backed Indonesian assault.

For four long and bloody years, the U.S. media, with very rare exceptions, kept close to the U.S. government propaganda line. During 1975, there was considerable coverage of East Timor, a reflection of the concern over decolonization in the former Portuguese empire. In late 1975, the *NY Times* was reporting Indonesia's laudable "restraint" at the same time that Australian journalists were filing eyewitness reports of Indonesian naval bombardment of Timorese towns and military attacks along the border. An Australian journalist, the first to enter East Timor after the August civil war, wrote a lengthy report in the *London Times* in which he rejected allegations of Fretilin atrocities, which he attributed to Indonesian and other propaganda services. His report appeared in the *NY Times*, edited to make it appear that the charges were accurate, as *Newsweek* reported, basing itself on the *NY Times* account. After the Indonesian invasion, reporting in the U.S. diminished rapidly, approaching zero (apart from occasional U.S. government and Indonesian propaganda handouts) as the U.S.-backed Indonesian assault expanded in scale and violence. Timorese refugees were scrupulously avoided, in dramatic contrast to refugees from Communist oppression. When Henry Kamm, the Pulitzer Prize-

winning Southeast Asian correspondent of the *NY Times*, deigned to mention East Timor, he did not rely on the reports of refugees, priests, or the numerous other sources available. Rather, he interviewed Indonesian generals, and on their authority presented the "fact" that Fretilin had "forced" the people to live under its "control," though now they were fleeing to Indonesian-held areas. Reporting on a four-day visit to East Timor (28 January 1980),Kamm informs the reader that 300,000 Timorese were "displaced by persistent civil war and struggle against the invaders" — there had been no civil war, apart from U.S. and Indonesian propaganda handouts and the "news columns" of the Western press, since September 1975. He reports that "the Fretilin hold over the population" was broken by the 1978 Indonesian offensive and that Fretilin "controlled significant parts of the population at least until 1977." Nowhere is there any indication of even the possibility that Fretilin savagery, are based on evidence derived from Indonesian authorities,Timorese collaborators, or Timorese who, as he notes, were so intimidated by the ever-present Indonesian military authorities that their statements were obviously meaningless.

By late 1979, the truth was beginning to break through, even in the U.S. press, and a number of Congressman, notably Tom Harkin of Iowa had become aware of the true nature of what had been concealed by the media. The *NY Times* ran an honest editorial on December 24 1979, and James Markham filed the first report on the many Timorese refugees in Lisbon (28 January, 1980). The *Christian Science Monitor* had published several accurate reports by January 1980, and other journals too have begun to present some of the information that has been available for four years, though much distortion persists and the crucial U.S. role is generally ignored or downplayed.

The importance of the behavior of the media and journals of opinion during these years cannot be overemphasized. The events described by Father Leoneto and many others, and the horrendous consequences that are now at last widely conceded, are the direct responsibility of the United States government, and to a lesser extent, its Western allies. Correspondingly, these monstrous acts could have been—and still can be—brought to an end by withdrawal of direct U.S. support for them. The U.S. government has been backing the Indonesian military not because it takes pleasure in massacre and starvation, but because the fate of the Timorese is simply a matter of no significance when measured against higher goals. Since 1965, when the Indonesian military took power in a coup that led to the slaughter of perhaps 500,000 to 1,000,000 people, mostly landless peasants, Indonesia has been a valued ally. The military rulers have opened the country to Western plunder, hindered only by the rapacity and corruption of our friends in Jakarta. In this potentially rich country, much of the population has suffered enormously—even apart from the huge massacres, which demonstrated proper anti-Communist credentials to an appreciative Western audience—as the country has been turned into a "paradise for investors." In comparison with these overriding considerations, it is natural that the Human Rights Administration, like its predecessor, will pour arms into Indonesia to enable it to achieve its ends in East Timor, and will attempt in every way to conceal the truth.

The importance of the deception becomes clear when we observe what happens when the system of indoctrination begins to unravel. However institutions may function, individuals are not prepared to support actions that verge on genocide. As the truth has begun to break through, a number of members of Congress and increasing segments of the population are beginning to demand an end to these atrocious acts. One result has been that some aid is being sent, though without adequate international supervision it is doubtful that it will reach those who need it, given the corruption of the Indonesian military. There is, for the first time, a real possibility that pressure will be put on the U.S. government to stop providing the military supplies that Indonesia requires, and that international efforts may be organized to induce Indonesia to withdraw, so that the remnants of the population that survive may have the opportunity to realize their long-sought right to self-determination.

It is intriguing to see how some segments of the media are reacting to the fact that information about East Timor is now beginning to reach the public. In *The Nation*—the only U.S. journal to have published a serious article on Timor from 1975 through 1978—A.J. Langguth dismissed the concern over Timor with the following remarkable comment: "If the world press were to converge suddenly on Timor, it would not improve the lot of a single Cambodian" (16 February 1980). The irrationality of the comment is at first startling, but the sentiment becomes intelligible on the assumption that it is only the other fellow's crimes that deserve attention. In the *Washington Journalism Review* (March 1980), Richard Valeriani of NBC and Asia specialist and former foreign correspondent Stanly Karnow discussed one of the reports on East Timor that appeared in the *NY Times* in late January 1980. Valeriani said that he read it, though "I don't care about Timor." Karnow couldn't bring himself even to read the story: "I just didn't have time...There was no connection; it didn't have anything to do with me." Their point was that the *Times* was giving *too much coverage* to the insignificant fact that massacres in Timor rival those of Cambodia and that the population has been reduced to the state of the miserable victims on the Thai-Cambodian border as a direct result of U.S. policies. The *Times* is failing in its responsibilities by devoting space to such trivia—but not, for example, by devoting the entire front cover and 25 pages of the Sunday magazine section a few days earlier (20 January 1980) to the horrendous

experiences of Dith Pran in Cambodia, recapitulating stories that have received massive media attention.

Their reactions are not unique. The UN correspondent of the *New York Times*, Bernard Nossiter, refused an invitation to a press conference on East Timor in October 1979 on the grounds that the issue was "rather esoteric," and in fact reported not a word on the UN debate, which included testimony from Timorese refugees and others on the continuing atrocities and the U.S. responsibility for them. A look at the stories he did publish during those days reveals that events must be insignificant indeed to fall below the threshold for the *Times*. Thus Nossiter devoted a full-page column to the world-shaking fact that the government of Fiji had not been paid for its contingent in Southern Lebanon, and shortly after, reported a debate over a missing comma, of undeterminable import, in a UN document—though in this case, his report is to be understood as part of the campaign of ridicule that has been directed against the United Nations, in particular its Third World membership, ever since the UN escaped from the control of the United States and fell under what is called here "the tyranny of the majority," or what others call "democracy." Hence the sarcastic report of the debate over the missing comma, coupled with total silence on the role of Third World nations in bringing to the United Nations the story of the U.S.-backed massacres in Timor.

Perhaps the most intriguing response to the recent breakdown of media suppression is that of the *Wall Street Journal*, which devoted an editorial to the topic (6 February 1980). The *Journal* takes note of "an interesting campaign" that "has been shaping up over the past few weeks on the issue of East Timor." It observes that 100,000 people may have died during the war, adding that

> It sounds suspiciously like Cambodia, some people are saying. And this one is ours: Indonesia is our ally and oil supplier, it's American arms that the Indonesians used to perpetrate their atrocities.

But this charge, the *Journal* continues, "tells less about Timor than it does about certain varieties of American political thinking." There are two factors that crucially distinguish Timor from Cambodia. The first is that the U.S. is sending some aid to Timor and the Indonesians, "however grudgingly and imperfectly," are letting the food in, whereas "the Cambodians would be in considerably better shape if the Soviet Union undertook comparable behavior for itself and its ally"—the editors choose to ignore the fact that the Soviet Union provided aid to starving Cambodians long before the U.S. did, and, it appears, in far larger quantities, as well as the fact, reported by international aid workers, that their aid was let in not at all grudgingly. But the crucial distinction, which deserves quotation in full, is this:

> But more important, it's self-deluding to talk as if the U.S. had the power any longer to determine the outcome of a situation like Timor. The violence that has cursed the place is the wholly unsurprising mark of a disintegrating world order; talk about the evils of U.S. power is likely to hasten that disintegration, not arrest it. Those worried about the human costs of such chaos might do well to start facing up to that connection.

The reasoning is not without interest for students of contemporary propaganda. The editors are trying to tell us that when U.S.-supplied helicopter gunships demolish villages, destroy crops, massacre mountain tribesmen and drive them to concentration camps, we are to understand these facts as "the mark of a disintegrating world order," not the results of U.S. actions, consciously undertaken. And if the U.S. were to withhold the crucial military and diplomatic support that enables Indonesia to carry out these policies, the terror would be even worse, since its cause is purely abstract. One wonders whether *Pravda* rises to such intellectual heights when it justifies Soviet support for the Ethiopian war in Eritrea.

It is easy enough to make fun of the *Wall Street Journal*, but that would be to overlook the more significant point. The slight exposure of U.S.-backed Indonesian atrocities during the past several months has frightened the Indonesian military, the U.S. government, and the business circles represented by the *Wall Street Journal*, all of whom want to play their games with people's lives in secret. The message is clear. By significantly extending the pressure on the U.S. government to abandon its appalling policies, and continuing to work to bring the facts to a larger public, one can contribute materially to the survival of the people of East Timor. It is rare that an opportunity arises in which a relatively small amount of effort may save thousands of lives, and it would be criminal to allow it to pass.

Noam Chomsky
March 2, 1980

Noam Chomsky, long-time commentator and critic of U.S. foreign policy, is Professor of Linguistics at M.I.T. He has spoken and written extensively about East Timor. Noam Chomsky and Jose' Ramos-Horta, FRETILIN representative to the U.N., were the key-note speakers at the December 9, 1979 event organized by the Asian Center. Professor Chomsky has presented testimony about East Timor before the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in 1978 and 1979. His most recent book (which is co-authored by Edward S. Herman) *The Political Economy of Human Rights* is partially devoted to an analysis of human rights violations in Indonesia and East Timor.



ACTION SUGGESTIONS

There are many simple and effective things you can do to help stop genocide in East Timor.

I. **Write letters to your Senators, Congressional Representatives, and editors of the publications that you read.** Send us a copy of responses received. Visits to Congressmen in their local offices are also very effective.

• Urge that humanitarian assistance to East Timor be channelled through a significantly increased number of international relief personnel and that they actually distribute the aid in East Timor.

• Urge that all U.S. military aid be cut off to Indonesia until the Government of Indonesia withdraws all its troops from East Timor. So far the U.S. has supplied about $11 million in humanitarian assistance to East Timor. But since the December 1975 invasion, the U.S. has provided more than twenty times that amount in military aid to Indonesia. In addition, the Indonesian use of U.S. military equipment in their invasion and occupation of East Timor violates a 1958 bilateral arms agreement and U.S. laws which specify that U.S. military equipment be used only for national defense and never for acts of aggression.

• Urge that the people of East Timor be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination freely. The U.N. has urged 5 times in the General Assembly and twice in the Security Council that the Government of Indonesia withdraw its troops to allow internationally supervised elections in East Timor. Urge that the U.S., which has opposed recent U.N. resolutions, reverse its stand.

• Urge that the Government of Indonesia allow free travel in and out of East Timor. More international journalists need to be able to report from East Timor, and Timorese who wish to leave should be allowed to do so. The severity of the situation in East Timor can be traced in part to the sealing off of the country to international journalists and the Indonesian government's refusal to allow the people of East Timor their right to emigrate. The unreported genocide in East timor has thus gone unchecked; news filtering out from East has thus been disputed.

It is extremely important that you write and visit your Congressional representatives. There is interest among your Congressional representatives in Washington, D.C. They need your support before taking a public stand on the issue. Representative Tom Harkin, who has been doing a lot of work on East Timor, is sponsoring a House Resolution in March. Let your Congressional Representatives know how you feel about East Timor and mention the Harkin resolution in your letter.

Indonesia is extremely sensitive to international pressure. In October 1977, Amnesty International released a major report on political prisoners in Indonesia. Two months later, 10,000 political prisoners who had been held without trial for more than twelve years were released. Since then, another 20,000 prisoners have been released. The intransigence of Indonesia can be traced in part to the lack of response from the West. Make it different; write your letter and make your visit.

Portugal's role in resolving the situation in East Timor is a crucial one. The Portuguese are also very sensitive to international pressure. The Prime Minister of Portugal made campaign promises that he would press for an Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor. Write Prime Minister Sa Carneiro at the Assembly of the Republic, Sa Bento, Lisbon, Portugal.

II. **Using our resources, get more people involved in working on the East Timor issue.** Organize an event with the **Timor: Island of Fear, Island of Hope** film. Use our audio-visual show. Contact us for suggestions about speakers. Distribute our reprints.

III. **Help us do our work.** Some of you may be able to contribute financially to our work on East Timor. Others can help by organizing a fund-raising event. We will need a lot of help to make this campaign effective. We hope you will help.

We need your assistance in making better use of the materials we have. Can you get a taped talk on East Timor on your radio? Can you get some people to watch a film? Can you get a speaker into your local college?

resources

RESOURCES

To help you with your writing, organizing and fund-raising around the East Timor issue, the following resources are available from the Asian Center.

AUDIO-VISUALS

Timor: Island of Fear, Island of Hope. To date, this is the only film about the invasion of East Timor. The film was made and released around the time of the Indonesian invasion. Thus it does not discuss the massive slaughter, starvation and disease that prevails in the country.

Audio-Visual show. A set of slides and taped talk meant to supplement the film.

TAPES

Taped talks. These 15-minute talks by people knowledgeable on particular aspects of the East Timor issue are meant to be aired over non-commercial radio stations, particularly campus radio stations and listener sponsored radio stations. If you know of anybody who can use these talks, please put them in touch with the Asian Center.

REPRINTS

Reprints of particularly significant speeches and reports on the East Timor situation are available for 50 cents each. They tend to be focused on a particular facet of the issue.

- Noam Chomsky's 1978 and 1979 speeches before the Decolonization Committee of the General Assembly, U.N. The 1978 speech exposes the subservience of the major press to the State Department and the Indonesian interpretation of the East Timor situation. The 1979 speech is an up-date of the 1978 speech.
- Jose' Ramos-Horta's 1979 speech before the Decolonization Committee of the General Assembly U.N. His speech articulates Fretilin's position and details the widespread violations of human rights committed by Indonesian troops in his own country.
- Bruce Cameron's speeches before the Decolonization Committee and the House Sub-Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Cameron is the Legislative Aide for Foreign Policy, Americans for Democratic Action. His speech before the Decolonization Committee focuses on the contradictions between the espoused human rights policy of the Carter Administration and U.S. policy towards Indonesia and East Timor. He spoke on the need for increased volume and monitoring of humanitarian aid to East Timor before the House Sub-Committee.
- Arnold Kohen and Roberta Quance, "The Politics of Starvation," *Inquiry*, February 18, 1980. Develops the argument that the current situation in East Timor is a deliberate policy on the part of the Indonesians. Also provides details of the December 4th hearings on the famine in East Timor before the House Sub-Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.
- The Asian Center is also willing to supply interested people working on the East Timor issue with newspaper cuttings from the U.S. and foreign press. Please inquire.

BOOKS

For systematic documentation of the events leading up to the Indonesian invasion, analysis of Indonesian occupation policies and positions of the various European governments, see:

- Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, **Washington Connection and Third World Fascism**, South End Press, Boston, 1979, pp. 129ff. $5.50
- Arnold Kohen and John Taylor, **An Act of Genocide**, TAPOL, U.K., 1979. $4.25

ORGANIZATIONS

The following organizations have on-going programs about East Timor.

- East Timor Research Project
410 Stewart Avenue
Ithaca, N.Y. 14850

- Asian Center
198 Broadway, Room 302
N.Y., N.Y. 10038

Asian Center
198 Broadway, Room 302
N.Y., N.Y. 10038